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Abstract
This study examines the relationship between the state of the U.S. economy and
the outcome of general elections for incumbents in the U.S. House of Representatives.
The analysis uses a unique data set compiled from a sample of U.S. Congressional
Elections and state and economic indicators between the years 1999 and 2014. We find
that economic indicators are consistently related to election outcomes, but have a larger
and more significant effect when the time period examined is closer to a major economic
event, such as the Great Recession. We also find that female incumbent candidates are
more negatively affected by increases in the unemployment rate than their male
counterparts. The results imply the existence of a gender bias against women in elections
that consider economic indicators highly. These findings highlight what is of greatest
importance to the voting electorate during voting season in the 21st century.
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I.

Introduction
National economic conditions regularly influence both state and national elections.

Every two years when voters return to the polls for Congressional elections, they are
faced with the ability to reelect their incumbent or vote a new candidate into office. This
choice is often linked with the voter’s opinion of the current economic environment. The
theory of economic voting posits that voters focus only on incumbent candidates and
consider economic events to evaluate their performances. Since an average voter is not
directly impacted by or extremely knowledgeable about many specific policies, their
decision would only take into account common macroeconomic indicators, such as
income, unemployment, price levels, and growth. Voters then reward incumbent
candidates for positive conditions by reelecting them or punish them for poor conditions
by voting in their challenger. The theory and study of economic voting hinges on one
assumption known as the Responsibility Hypothesis. The Responsibility Hypothesis is
the belief that voters hold the government responsible for economic events1. This simple
hypothesis has given a foundation to almost all research into economic voting as it draws
a connection between the economy and the vote and thus ties together economics and
political science. This theory would suggest that the voting electorate only considers the
incumbent candidate and a handful of economic indicators when making their voting
decision. Yet, does this hypothesis hold water in today’s political climate? It is necessary
to further analyze the effects of the economy on voting patterns in order to provide a
better explanation of the priorities of the general electorate.

1

Lewis-Beck, M. and M. Paldam, “Economic Voting: An Introduction”
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Before we proceed, it is important to clarify how candidates are elected to the United
States Congress. The two chambers of the U.S. Congress consist of the Senate, whose
100 members serve six-year terms, and the House of Representatives, whose 435
members serve two-year terms. Congressional elections are held every two years during
which time the entire House and one third of the Senate is up for election. Unlike the
president, Senate and House members have no limit on the number of terms they can
serve. The reason we will be examining Congressional elections is due to the size of the
governing body and the way candidates are elected. Presidential elections rely on
Electoral College votes rather than the national popular vote, whereas Congressional
elections rely solely on the popular vote in each state. We believe the popular vote
provides a better representation of the will of the electorate and therefore a better
indication of the effect of the economy on voting.
There are three types of Congressional elections: primary, general, and special. A
primary election is a nominating election held by a state’s political party to determine the
party’s candidate. During a closed primary election, a Democrat would run against a
Democrat and a Republican against a Republican and only affiliated party members
would be able to vote for those candidates. Occasionally, open primaries are held where
non-party members are allowed to vote on party candidates. After Democratic and
Republican primaries have finished, these candidates (and any others if there is another
party running) face each other in a general election. In a general election, the whole state
is given the opportunity to vote on any candidate, regardless of their party affiliation. The
winner of the general election becomes a member of the next U.S. Congress. A special
election is held to fill an office that has become vacant between general elections. This
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usually occurs when a member has resigned or passed away during their term. In this
situation, the state will hold special primaries and a special general election in order to fill
the empty position.
In this research, only general elections that include an incumbent and occur during
Congressional election years will be considered. Since these elections only happen every
two years, a considerable amount of time passes between election years. Thus, by only
examining the past eight congresses, we are able to cover sixteen years of economic
events. These sixteen years not only provide a large sample size, but they also contain
several major economic events, such as the Dot Com Boom, the Housing Bubble, and the
Great Recession. We believe these eight Congressional elections will provide insight to
the effects of economic voting during both good times and bad.
With an increasing percentage of women in Congress, it is worthwhile to address the
effect of gender within economic voting tendencies. Women first reached a level of 10%
House occupancy in 1993 and have increased this percentage every year since. Yet, it
was not until the 114th Congress that at least 100 women were elected to serve in the
Senate and House of Representatives. In the majority of elections, there are only a
handful of female candidates as compared to males. For example, in 2014, of the 249
women who filed with the FEC to run for the U.S. House, only 161 made it past primary
elections, and of them, only 80 were elected to serve in the House2. When women
outnumber men in 39 states3, what can explain the stunning gender gap in American
politics? From previous research, we know that male candidates are seen as stronger with

2

Women Candidates 2014, Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP), Eagleton Institute of
Politics, Rutgers University.
3
Schwarz, Hunter. "In Most States, Women Outnumber Men." Washington Post.
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economic issues while female candidates are stronger with education or health care4. As
such, are female candidates affected by economic voting in the same way as male
candidates? For example, would a voter seeking to punish their male incumbent for poor
conditions decide to reelect him if the only alternative was a female? If so, this would
confirm the existence of a blatant gender bias in U.S. politics and more clearly explain
the role of the economy in the results of national elections.
In order to investigate this issue more thoroughly, we will examine past
Congressional elections and compare them to several macroeconomic indicators. We will
look at Congressional elections beginning with the 107th Congress who were elected to
serve starting in January 2001. To account for the economic state of the country, statelevel data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the
Bureau of Energy Information will be used to summarize the various economic
conditions. National-level data will be used to further explain what voters take into
account when making decisions. Election data will come from Congressional Election
Reports, which define incumbents and challengers, as well as their demographics and the
result of the race. Using a multiple linear regression analysis, we will seek to find a
correlation between good (poor) economic conditions and an increased percent of votes
received by the incumbent (challenger). In addition, in order to analyze the effect of
gender bias on election results, the data will include interaction terms between the
incumbent gender dummy variable and the other variables. In this analysis, we expect to
find that there will be a significant difference in voting patterns if the incumbent
candidate is female. If this hypothesis proves correct, we believe it will provide a
4

Huddy, Leonie, and Nayda Terkildsen. "Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female
Candidates."
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significant insight into both the patterns of economic voting as well as how gender bias
affects election rates for males and females across United States House elections.
II.

Literature Review
A.

History of Economic Voting Research

When considering how voters first begin to make their decisions, it is vitally
important to define the indicators used to evaluate their candidates. Much early research
in this area was based on V.O. Key’s seminal study that posits voters as an “electorate
god of vengeance.” According to research done in The Responsible Electorate (1966),
Key found that voters used past experiences to evaluate the performances of candidates.
He showed that voters evaluated only their incumbent candidates and punished or
rewarded them according to their interpretation of past or current economic conditions.
Following Key’s work, Edward Tufte authored a similar study regarding midterm
Congressional elections. He combined aggregate survey data on presidential approval
ratings with aggregate economic data on the yearly change in real disposable income.
While his study was mostly interested in analyzing the effect of presidential popularity on
midterm elections, he found that a $50 change in real disposable income in the past year
affected the vote by 1.8 percentage points (Tufte 1975). It seems almost unbelievable that
a change as small as $50 could affect the vote by such a significant amount, however this
may be the result of a relatively small window of observations where the change in real
disposable income from year to year never exceeded $150. These studies were the
foundation of the belief that changes in economic conditions between the past and the
current election were what voters used to evaluate candidates.
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But in Fiorina’s 1978 investigation, very little evidence was found to suggest that the
electorate was voting using knowledge of past experiences. Using data from election
surveys, Fiorina was able to measure whether respondents felt their economic condition
had improved, worsened, or stayed the same over the past few years. Using this data in a
regression, which also included data on similar survey questions regarding consumer
prices and unemployment, he found that there is little evidence to support retrospective
voting. However, we believe there are several problems with Fiorina’s analysis. First, the
survey question does not clearly define the time period the respondent should consider.
An individual could have fared worse in the “past few years” as a result of an incumbent
who had already been voted out or even a personal financial matter, such as medical bills
or a car accident. Regardless of these rather weak results, Fiorina’s work set the
foundation for a series of studies that began to look at voter expectations as a replacement
for, or an addition to, retrospective considerations. In some of the most recent literature,
prospective voting has gained a serious foothold (Lewis-Beck 1988, Lockerbie 1991,
Teixeira 1998). These studies use responses from election surveys or current population
surveys to measure the level of optimism (or pessimism) the general electorate feels
about the economy or the upcoming election. Similar to retrospective models, these
studies expect to find that voters will elect an incumbent (challenger) when their
expectations for the future are good (poor).
However, we believe the use of prospective variables undermines the overall theory
of economic voting. We have chosen to define economic voting as the idea that voters
only consider the incumbent and evaluate their performance based on economic events.
However, it is impossible to evaluate a candidate based on economic events that have not
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yet occurred. Voter expectations, while a valuable measure of national economic
optimism or pessimism, are not a valid measure of incumbent performance. As both
Lewis-Beck (1988) and Erickson (1990) argue, both past experience and future hope
determine much of vote choice. If we make the assumption that voters are rational actors,
their behavior should seek to maximize their expected utility by using their past
knowledge to judge incumbents' credibility and to cement their expectations.
Expectations are a learned process largely built from past and current experiences. As
such, the model will not use variables from election surveys such as the American
National Election Studies (ANES) to measure voters’ future expectations as it is
redundant to include expectations that are built from concrete experience. Expectations
do not accurately represent the theory of economic voting as a method of rewards and
punishments. Thus, we will instead use data to measure economic indicators during the
election year and the year preceding to estimate the overall economic voting behavior of
voters during election seasons.
Past or future, the question now becomes, what do voters use to evaluate the
economy? At this point, the research appears to be evenly split between collective or
“sociotropic” and personal or “pocketbook” voting. Sociotropic voting considers the
overall state of the economy using state and national-level economic indicators when
evaluating candidates. Alternatively, pocketbook voting is when voters only consider
their personal economic indicators such as disposable income or prices to measure their
financial well-being and evaluate how a candidate has performed. Most of the earlier
research tends to examine voters’ decisions by using their personal economic grievances,
as revealed by changes in real income and unemployment in the years leading up to an
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election (Kramer 1971, Fiorina 1978). Kramer examined nominal and real income,
unemployment, and cost of living indices for the current and preceding year. Using a
regression, he finds the coefficients on income (both nominal and real) to be highly
significant in every case and that price indices are significant in some regressions, but not
all. Similarly, using the survey data that asked individuals to state how their personal
financial situation had changed in past years, in a logit regression Fiorina found that
personal financial conditions are related to presidential election results. However, he did
not find as convincing results when examining Congressional elections. While we
maintain that the data used by Fiorina is not strong evidence to disprove retrospective
voting behavior, it does an effective job of representing the influence of pocketbook
indicators.
In 1979, Kinder and Kieweit published a study specifically analyzing personal
economic discontent and found no connection between personal grievances and voting
patterns. Using survey data, they took responses from questions such as “would you say
that you (and your family) are better off or worse off financially than you were a year
ago?” and “are you making as much money now as you were a year ago, or more, or
less?” Using these responses as well as information regarding unemployment from the
Current Population Survey (CPS), they performed regressions on the elections between
1956 and 1976. Of these eleven elections, only two were shown to have been
significantly affected by personal economic conditions. However, we find the sources of
data used in this study to be weak. These survey responses allow too much room for
error, as personal grievances may have been caused by events completely unrelated to the
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performance of a candidate and therefore likely only loosely related to a voter’s
perception of their incumbent.
Nevertheless, this study opened the door to a wave of research that moved away from
personal economic grievances and toward a more collective interpretation of voting
behavior. The theory of collective voting makes an important assumption that the average
voter is aware of the state of the national economy and votes according to their
expectations for the future. While this assumption may seem like a reach, according to
surveys by the Pew Research Center, roughly 60% of respondents either “very closely” or
“fairly closely” followed stories about the state of the U.S. economy in the prior week5.
Similarly, the economy has been considered “very important” in elections by more than
80% of respondents6 for the past six years. Therefore, we believe it is safe to make the
assumption that the average voter is aware of the economy and considers it a high
priority. However, it is important to note that while 60% of respondents “closely or fairly
closely” followed stories about the U.S. economy, they may not have been following
stories that examined issues such as inflation or GDP.
As anyone who has turned on the news recently can tell you, only a select few
economic indicators are regularly mentioned on television. A study by the Project for
Excellence in Journalism found that during the Great Recession, only three major
storylines accounted for nearly 40% of coverage on economic issues. These three were
the bailout, the stimulus, and the auto industry. In fourth place, unemployment accounted

5

"Pew Research Center for the People & the Press Poll." Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press.
6
“Pew Research Center for the People & the Press Religion & Politics Poll.” Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press.
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for just over 6% of total economic media coverage7. This could suggest that while voters
are exposed to and follow storylines about the U.S. economy, they may only be exposed
to a small percent of all the issues present. This same study also found an interesting
correlation between a positive performance of the Dow and a decrease in media coverage
about the economy. This could suggest that voters are bombarded with more economic
news coverage when times are bad than when they are good, leading to a bias towards
negative economic voting.
Nagler and Niemann’s 1997 study of economic reference groups provides a
framework that combines the concepts of pocketbook and sociotropic voting patterns. As
they claim, the sociotropic theory posits that voters believe the state of the national
economy is the best predictor of how the voter’s pocketbook will fare. The great deal of
overlap between sociotropic and pocketbook voting is a result of voters’ understanding of
the national economy being colored by their own hopes and experiences. Due to these
connections, we believe that analyzing both types of voting provides a more wellrounded explanation of voting behavior. We will use state-level data to serve as a proxy
for pocketbook indicators. We believe analyzing state-level economic conditions such as
real income and unemployment are as important as national factors, such as GDP growth
and inflation.
B.

Demographic Effects

In a country as large as the United States, the demographic differences are vast. As
such, it would be impossible to assume that the interests of voters are the same regardless
of their geographical and cultural differences. Fortunately, other researchers have noted
7

Project for Excellence in Journalism. “Covering the Great Recession: How the Media Have Depicted the
Economic Crisis During Obama’s Presidency.” Pew Research Center. 2011.
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this problem and responded accordingly. Ebeid and Rodden (2006), Ansolabehere,
Rodden, and Snyder (2006), and Levernier and Barrilla (2006) all address the issue of
demographic and partisan differences across the country and how they affected voting
patterns. Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder found that economic issues had a greater
effect on the vote than moral issues and actually may be responsible for more of the
divide between “regularly Republican” and “regularly Democratic” states than previously
thought. They did find that socioeconomic status had a connection to economic policy
preferences, with individuals with higher income tending to be more aligned with
conservative policies. Ebeid and Rodden’s analysis focused more on the geography of the
United States and the industrial sectors that were associated with different regions. They
found that the cultural differences between rural and metropolitan economic structures
had an effect on voting patterns with economic voting occurring most strongly in nonrural and non-farming states. Finally, Levernier and Barrilla performed county-level
analyses to determine how region and demographics affected the 2000 presidential vote.
They found that a variety of different variables had an effect on voting, such as public
assistance income, labor force participation, race, and religion. The results of these
studies imply that demographic considerations will need to be included in order to reach a
better understanding of the political economy of the United States.
The demographic differences across the United States also likely have a connection to
the varying expectations for female and male candidates across the country. The most
obvious evidence comes from an article in which college students are asked to explain
their preferences on a series of fictional elections (Fox and Smith 1998). The cultural and
geographical differences that exist between California and Wyoming likely contributed to
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results where California students only favored men by about 1% whereas Wyoming
students favored men by 10-12%. This stunning difference opens the door to deeper
investigations into the regional and cultural divides that exist in the United States and the
way those differences affect the political status of women.
C.

Gender Bias

While little research has yet to be performed on the effect of the economy as it
specifically pertains to the success of female candidates, past research has explored how
the economy relates to general candidate strength and success (Huddy and Terkildsen
1993, Dolan 2004, King and Leigh 2010). In the investigations into political gender bias
against women, many researchers have attempted to define whether it is voter or selection
bias that is more harmful to female candidates. Selection bias is defined as a bias against
females by a political party that has implemented barriers to entry against women (such
as selecting them to run for unwinnable seats or running them against popular or
unbeatable candidates) whereas voter bias is defined as the individual bias a voter may
have against a female candidate. While some evidence of selection bias was found in an
Australian study (King and Leigh 2010), no similar results were found in studies of the
U.S. (Milyo and Schosberg 2000). It can be suggested then that the majority of bias
against females comes not from parties, but from individual voters, as was seen in the
study by Fox and Smith.
In the U.S. political environment, females are not only disadvantaged by gender
stereotypes but also policy stereotypes. In several studies, researchers found that women
are viewed to have a stronger capacity to handle “compassion” issues such as poverty,
health care, the elderly, education, children and family issues, and the environment
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whereas men are more equipped to handle the economy and the military (Dolan 2004,
Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Overall, the stereotypical traits of women as kind and
compassionate hurts their image with issues that voters have decided require more
masculine traits, such as strength or assertiveness. This is especially disadvantageous
when we have already seen a great deal of evidence to prove that economic
considerations are some of the most influential in voting behavior. If a female candidate
is viewed as a weak competitor for economic policies because of gender bias, she faces a
much more challenging battle for the vote. By interacting a gender variable with other
variables, we will be better able to determine if a gender bias is what causes different
patterns in voting behavior.
Prior research into the area of economic voting and gender bias has built a foundation
on which we would like to update and expand upon. With the convincing research
conducted in the areas of retrospective voting, sociotropic voting, and pocketbook voting,
we hope to combine all three considerations to better account for economic effects on
voting patterns. In this way, this study will widen the scope from prior research. Since the
years following 1999 have been economically tumultuous, we will also provide more
recent and relevant results as the majority of the literature only analyzed elections prior to
2000. Finally, we will expand our research to a new area of study by analyzing the effects
of gender bias; a dimension that has not been adequately explored in existing studies.
Specifically, this approach allows us to find the influence of economic conditions on
voting patterns and whether these results are consistent regardless of gender.
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III.

Research Methods
We examine past Congressional elections and compare them to the changes in

several macroeconomic indicators over the previous 22 months. We look at eight
Congressional elections beginning with the 107th Congress who were elected to serve
starting in January 2001 and ending with data on the 114th Congress, who began their
terms in January 2015. This set of Congressional elections will span a diverse sample of
economic trends in the United States, from the Dot Com Boom in the early 2000s to the
Great Recession beginning in late 2007.
Using the eight regions defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, numbers
were assigned to the states within these regions and a random number generator was used
to pick two states from each region. Since regional areas in the United States experience
different economic conditions as a result of differing patterns of productive sectors, it is
important that the data include samples from states in every geographical region but in a
way that avoids selection bias. From the sixteen states that have been randomly selected,
a random number generator randomly selects two races from each election year to decide
which district’s elections to analyze. Since we are only interested in the effects of
economic voting as it pertains to incumbent candidates, if the race randomly selected did
not include an incumbent candidate, another race was chosen at random until each state
had two incumbent races. Given these states and individual races, data from U.S.
government bureaus were collected and compiled into a data set containing demographic
variables for the incumbent and states, as well as economic indicators on the state and
national level.
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This data will be used to run a multiple regression analysis. We expect to find a
correlation between good (poor) economic conditions and an increase in the percent of
the vote received by the incumbent (challenger). If this hypothesis is correct, it would do
a great deal to explain some of the variation in voting patterns in the United States. In
addition, in order to analyze the effect of gender bias on election results, we included an
interaction term between the candidate gender dummy variable and the state
unemployment variable and reestimated the regression. In this analysis, we expect to find
a significant difference in the effect of being female on voting outcomes. Following the
estimation of the models, we compare the predicted results to the actual election results
and examine the discrepancies.
We believe that the role of gender in the U.S. political environment will lead
voters to reelect a male incumbent regardless of poor economic conditions due to a
negative bias towards female politicians. As such, we expect to find that any elections the
model fails to correctly predict may be due to the presence of a female challenger. If this
hypothesis proves correct, it will provide significant insight into how gender bias affects
election rates for males and females across United States House elections.

IV.

Data
The data set compiled is a unique collection of data from a variety of sources.

First and foremost, the data regarding the percent of the general election received by the
incumbent as well as their party affiliation was collected from the Congressional Election
Reports that are published by the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of
Representatives. Demographic information regarding each individual incumbent was
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collected from their personal website or government profiles. Race and gender were
determined based on visual examination of photos and name and age were set at the age
they were in the election year. Given that voters also determine race and gender through
the visual examination of their candidates, there should be little room for error in these
variables. Tenure was measured in the number of terms previously served, and if an
incumbent had served a partial term through a special election, it was considered a full
term. We also only considered races in which there was an incumbent candidate and
challenger(s). Districts that had an open seat or races where the incumbent ran unopposed
were not included in the analysis.
State demographic variables were collected from the 2000 and the 2010 Census.
Election years 2000-2008 use data from the 2000 Census, and 2010-2014 uses 2010
Census data. Variables on the male, white, and 65+ populations were measured as
dummies, where 1 indicates that the state has a larger population than the national
average. For instance, 72.4% of the U.S. population is white. If a state has a percentage of
white population greater than or equal to 72.4%, it would be assigned a 1, whereas a state
with less than 72.4% white population would be assigned a 0 for that variable. State-level
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis was used
to define how well the selected states are doing economically and summarize their
demographic composition. This data includes percent changes in unemployment levels,
and income growth as well as other demographic variables that measure the composition
of the state population’s gender division, racial division, and age. Information regarding
changes in regional retail gasoline prices from the U.S. Energy Information Association
(EIA) was included. We believe gas prices serve as the best proxy for a change in
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consumer price indices as most voters are acutely aware of penny changes in gas prices
while a change in price for a loaf of bread may go unnoticed.
The economic indicators are measured as a percent change between January of the
preceding year and October of the election year. The percent change in the
unemployment rate was calculated using seasonally adjusted data from the BLS and
stated as a percentage change, not a percentage point difference. They provide monthly
data on the state level that was used to calculate a unique percent change in
unemployment for each state for each election year. The Bureau of Economic Analysis
provided data on personal income growth, GDP, real GDP, and per capita GDP. Personal
income growth was the compounded annual growth rate between Q1 of the year prior to
Q3 of the election year provided at the state-level. For all GDP data, the percent change
was calculated at a state-level. Unfortunately, data has not yet been published for 2013 or
2014, making change in GDP data unavailable for the 2014 election cycle. The EIA
provided data on retail gas prices. The EIA have seven regions called Petroleum
Administration for Defense Districts, or PADDs. Using this monthly data, the percent
change in gas prices for states was calculated based on the PADD in which they were
located. All these data were then imported into STATA and properly encoded. A
summary of the variables and their definitions can be found in Table 1.
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics for all variables. Given the many dummy
variables used for the demographic characteristics of incumbents, the composition of the
data set is quickly made apparent. Of the 253 incumbents, 92% are white, 47% are
Democrat, 13% are female and the average tenure is just under five terms. The economic
variables are measured in percent changes from the previous January. While the mean
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values all appear to suggest that unemployment, gas prices, personal income, and all GDP
variables have risen steadily on average, these values can be deceiving. When examining
the data more closely, the trends in growth and decline vary considerably from year to
year. For example, unemployment was relatively steady until the Great Recession, at
which point unemployment rates skyrocketed and then eventually began to fall starting in
2012. Gas prices also steadily grew from 2000 until 2014, when they fell rapidly to some
of the lowest prices the country had seen in years. As such, it is important to take these
mean values with a grain of salt. The final variable to consider is that of
“incumfemalestateunem.” This variable was created by interacting the incumbent female
dummy variable with the variable on state unemployment. It is used later to measure the
effect of changes in the unemployment rate on specifically female incumbents.

V.

Empirical Models
In order to understand the impact of the economy on congressional election

outcomes, we estimate three ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. Each model
will examine the relationship between the votes received by the incumbent candidate and
economic conditions. The first and simplest model is defined as the following:
(1)

PERCENTi = α + β1STATEUNEM + β2STATEGAS + ε1

where PERCENT is the percent of the general election votes received by the incumbent,
STATEUNEM is the percent change in state level unemployment from the previous
January to October, STATEGAS is the percent change in regional level gas prices from
the previous January to October, and ε is the error term. The second model includes
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several explanatory variables regarding the demographics of the incumbent candidate and
is estimated as:
(2)

PERCENTi = α + β1STATEUNEM + β2STATEGAS + β3INCUMDEM +
β4INCUMFEMALE + β5INCUMWHITE + β6INCUMTENURE + ε1

where INCUMDEM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is a Democrat,
INCUMFEMALE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is female,
INCUMWHITE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is white, and
INCUMTENURE is the number of congressional terms served by the incumbent prior to
the election. The third model takes the form of the second model but includes a single
interaction term between INCUMFEMALE and STATEUNEM and takes the following
form:
(3)

PERCENTi = α + β1STATEUNEM + β2STATEGAS + β3INCUMDEM +
β4INCUMFEMALE + β5INCUMWHITE + β6INCUMTENURE +
β7INCUMFEMALESTATEUNEM + ε1
For each of these three specifications, we estimate the models during two

different time periods; 2000-2012 and 2000-2014. The purpose of these two time periods
is to isolate the effects of the Great Recession. In 2012, the economy and the general
population were still recovering from the aftermath of the Great Recession and the
economy still took the forefront in election concerns. However, in 2014, the economy had
mostly recovered and the focus during election season had shifted to new concerns. As
such, there are two estimates for each of the three models for a total of six different OLS
estimations.
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VI.

Results
The results for equations 1, 2, and 3 are listed in Table 3 for the time

specifications A of 2000-2012 and B of 2000-2014. The values listed are the coefficients
and the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
A.

Dropped Variables

Prior to defining the final three equations, regressions of every shape and size
were run on the full data set. First, we were forced to eliminate most of the GDP
variables due to their high levels of collinearity. Second, due to the lack of observations
of state and national GDP from the 2014 election cycle, we were limited to using a data
set of only 221 observations when including those variables rather than the full 253.
Down to only the variables on real GDP for 2000-2012, we could not find statistical
significance for any combination of regression attempts. There appeared to be simply no
correlation between the percent of the vote received and the percent change in state or
national real GDP. The same result was found with state personal income. There
appeared to be very little to no correlation between a change in personal income and the
general election vote. As a result, we were left with only state unemployment and state
gas prices as economic variables. While difficult to let go of so many variables, their
inclusion in the regression did not add any explanatory value and only hindered the
degrees of freedom. We also believe the two remaining variables account for a significant
amount of a voter’s understanding of the economy. Unemployment statistics are widely
used in news media coverage and are easily and commonly interpreted as a
comprehensive understanding of the condition of the national and state economy. Gas
prices are also a wonderful proxy for the influence of price changes, given that voters
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interact with gas prices on a nearly daily basis. High and low gas prices are the topics of
friendly conversation and the population complains over even a penny’s change. As a
result, we believe the remaining two variables provide a good measure of a voter’s
economic knowledge.
B.

Equation 1

The intention of equation 1 was to identify the effect of solely economic
indicators on the results of general elections. 1A estimates that a 1% increase in
unemployment will decrease the percent of the vote received by 5.27 percentage points
and a 1% increase in gas prices will decrease the percent by 6.49 percentage points. The
coefficient on unemployment is significant at the 1% level and gas prices are significant
at the 10% level. Including data from the 2014 election, a 1% increase in unemployment
and gas prices causes the vote received to decrease by 3.41 and 2.28 percentage points,
respectively. In this specification, only state unemployment is significant and at the 10%
level. These results follow the logic that the economy has a weaker effect on voting
behavior when a major economic event is less prominent.
C.

Equation 2

Equation 2 includes an additional four variables, which seek to measure the effect
of the characteristics of the incumbent candidate. Equation 2A estimates that a
Democratic candidate receives an extra 2.90 percentage points over a Republican
candidate, a female candidate receives 4.63 percentage points less than a male candidate,
a white candidate receives 7.83 percentage points less than candidates of other races, and
that for every additional term of tenure, an incumbent receives an additional 0.354
percentage points. The coefficients for Democratic, white, and tenure are all significant at
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the 5% level, while the coefficient on female candidates is significant at the 1% level. A
surprising coefficient sign in this model is that of a white incumbent. We did not expect
to find that white incumbents would receive less of the general vote than a person of
color, and especially not by almost 8 percentage points. However, this could be explained
by the extremely low number of non-white incumbents in the data set. Of the 221
observations in this specification, only 16 were non-white. Of those 16, only six had less
than three terms of prior tenure experience while nine had more than four terms of tenure
experience. As such, the more tenured incumbents won their districts by a considerable
margin. Ten of the elections were won by a margin greater than one standard deviation
away from the predicted percent. These significant wins could lead the coefficient on
white incumbents to a prediction that assumes nonwhite incumbents will perform better
and that white incumbents will perform worse accordingly. The 2A equation also
estimates a 1% increase in unemployment and gas prices will lead to a 5.38 and 5.66
percentage point decrease in votes received, respectively. However, in this specification,
only the coefficient on unemployment is statistically significant at the 1% level.
With the inclusion of 2014 observations, equation 2B sees a loss in overall
explanatory power from an R2 of .1448 in 2A to .1010 in 2B. The model estimates a
Democratic incumbent will receive an additional 1.28 percentage points, a female will
receive 3.44 fewer percentage points, a white incumbent will receive 6.23 fewer
percentage points, and that every 1 term of tenure gives an additional 0.478 percentage
points. Again, we see a similar result with the sign on the coefficient for white
incumbents. This is likely a continuation of the effect that was mentioned previously. In
this specification, the additional four nonwhite incumbents all received a percent of the
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vote that was more than one standard deviation from the predicted mean, further
solidifying the effect that white candidates will receive less of the general vote. The
coefficients on females and white incumbents are both significant at the 5% level while
the coefficient for tenure is again significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on Democrat
is not statistically significant in this model. A 1% increase in unemployment or gas prices
causes a 3.34 and 1.67 percentage point decrease in vote received, respectively. Gas
prices are again not significant but in this model, the statistical significance of
unemployment has fallen from the 1% level in 2A to only the 10% level in 2B. This again
suggests that the importance of economic factors declines when the country is more
removed from an economic event such as the Great Recession.
D.

Equation 3

The final equation includes an interaction term that attempts to measure how
differently women are affected by economic conditions. First, however, equation 3A
estimates that a Democrat will receive an additional 3.01 percentage points, a female will
receive 4.21 fewer, a white incumbent will receive 7.82 fewer, and for each prior term, an
incumbent will receive 0.345 more percentage points in the general election. The
coefficients on all four of these variables are significant at the 5% level. A 1% increase in
gas prices leads to a 5.29 percentage point decrease but is not statistically significant. A
1% increase in state unemployment leads to a decrease of 4.91 percentage points and is
significant at the 5% level. The difference in significance between these two variables
may be a result of the relative "importance" of gas prices versus unemployment rates. It
may be that voters consider a change in the unemployment rate to be more important than
a change in gas prices and react accordingly during the election. To measure this effect
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specifically on female candidates, we created a variable that interacted the female dummy
variable with the state unemployment variable. Then, after running the regression, an Ftest of joint significance was performed to find the P value for the two variables. The
coefficient on the interaction term plus the coefficient on the state unemployment term
equaled the coefficient for the effect of state unemployment on female candidates. For
model 3A, the coefficient was -11.98, meaning that a female incumbent received 7.08
percentage points less than a male for the same 1% increase in unemployment. The F-test
found this coefficient to be significant at the 5% level. This solidifies our belief that
female incumbents are punished more harshly for unemployment rates than are male
incumbents.
Equation 3B estimates a Democrat will receive 1.36 additional percentage points,
a female will receive 3.32 fewer, a white incumbent will receive 6.31 fewer, and a year of
tenure gives an additional 0.465 percentage points. In this case, the coefficients on female
and white are significant at the 5% level and tenure is significant at the 1% level.
However, Democrat is not found to be statistically significant. This model does not find a
change in gas prices or state unemployment to be statistically significant. We applied the
same procedure to the addition of the interaction term and found that the coefficient of a
change in unemployment on female incumbents to be -10.92; 8.07 percentage points
more than for a male incumbent. A test of joint significance gave a P value of 0.1022,
which can be considered marginally significant. This would suggest that the negative
effect of higher unemployment rates on female candidates is both greater than for male
incumbents and also marginally significant. As was seen in the previous models, the
effect of economic indicators on a data set that includes observations from a time period
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more removed from the Great Recession is weaker and less significant. While the
interaction term in 3B was only marginally significant, the overall results from 3A and
3B are clear; female incumbent candidates are punished more harshly for a negative
economic effect than are male incumbents.
E.

State Demographic Effects

Given the prior research in this area, we were interested to see if the state
demographics had an effect on the outcomes of the elections. When the state dummy
variables were included in the regressions, they were consistently insignificant. They also
caused the models to lose vital degrees of freedom and as a result, were dropped from the
main models. In a second attempt to measure their effect on election outcomes, we
generated the residual values from the predicted values of both time specifications. Then,
using the residuals as the dependent variable, we ran regressions that included only the
state dummy variables. Again, it was found that there was no statistical significance in
these models. Finally, in an attempt to measure the effect of state demographics on
female incumbents, interaction terms were created between the female incumbent dummy
variable and the state white and state male variables. These variables were included in the
regressions and then tested for joint significance. Yet again, there were no significant
results. It may be that the variables created were not specific enough to measure the true
effects of state demographics on election outcomes. Perhaps variables that measured
urban and rural populations or levels of education would provide greater explanatory
power. However, in this model, state demographics appear to have no significant effect
on the outcomes of congressional elections for either male or female candidates.
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F.

Predicted Values and Wrongful Losses

Following the creation of the third equation, predicted values for both the A and B
specifications of the model were generated. We also calculated the residuals from the true
value for each of these specifications and examined the races where the predicted values
fell more than two standard deviations from the true percentages. In each case, we then
closely examined the incumbent and the surrounding details of the race. We expected to
find predicted male losers as winners when pitted against a female challenger, but
unfortunately, no such situation occurred. In fact, every incumbent who won or lost by
more than two standard deviations from the predicted value faced off against a male
challenger. While we hoped to find an indication of what caused these incumbents to win
or lose by so much, there was no pattern to be found. However, there were interesting
results when we examined the “wrongful” losers. In this situation, “wrongful” was
defined as losers who were predicted to win by the model. Because of the two
specifications, 2000-2012 and 2000-2014, we have two different predicted and residual
variables. For the 2000-2012 specification, the model predicted that 24 of the 35 total
female incumbent candidates lost when they should have won. This is a “wrongful loss”
rate of 68%. For male incumbents in the same period, the model predicted that 108 of the
218 total male candidates lost when they should have won. This gives a wrongful loss
rate of 49.5%. While the model clearly does not predict vote percentages with complete
accuracy, there is a significant discrepancy between 68% and 49.5%. For the 2000-2014
specification, the wrongful loss rate for women is 51% while the wrongful loss rate for
men is 50%. There is clearly much less of a discrepancy during this time specification.
This further supports the hypothesis that women are more strongly affected by economic
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events than men. As seen in the earlier results, the 2000-2012 specification always saw
larger coefficients and stronger statistical significance in the economic variables. The
interaction term between the female dummy variable and the unemployment changes was
also larger and more statistically significant in the 2000-2012 specification. This suggests
that the economy was a more important election issue in 2000-2012 and that women were
more negatively affected by the increases in unemployment. This increased negative
effect on women would support the stronger wrongful loss rate in the 2000-2012
predicted results. As such, when the economy is a more important issue, women
wrongfully lose at a higher rate.

VII.

Conclusion
The importance of the economy in election results is undeniable, but there may be

many factors that are not traditionally assumed to be important. The models suggest that
the percent change in unemployment has a consistently large and significant effect on the
outcome of a general election for Congress. However, the demographic characteristics of
the incumbent candidate cannot be understated. Their addition to the model improved
explanatory power by 300% and were consistently significant through each specification.
It may in fact be that who you are in an election matters more than the political events
happening around you. While experience has an undeniably significant effect, the
coefficients on race, gender, and party affiliation are larger and sometimes equally
significant. In fact, it is possible even for the effects created by demographic
characteristics to outweigh the effect of the economy in the result of the election.
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Unfortunately, these demographic characteristics can work against female
incumbents. As suspected, female incumbents see a larger negative effect of an increase
in the unemployment rate. The true reasons for this impact are unknown, but it is likely
that gender bias and policy stereotypes negatively affect female candidates who are
running for reelection in a time of economic downturn. Because of the ingrained
stereotypes against women as weak economic leaders, competent incumbents suffer when
the economy suffers. Even a 0.1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate
could cause a female incumbent to lose a full percentage point in a close race.
Furthermore, our country is currently “represented” by a governing body that is 81%
male, 80% white, and an average of 57 years old. The overwhelming male majority in the
House represents a history of gender inequality and the longstanding tradition of maleonly politics. While women are certainly taking strides forward, the biases that lead to
unfair and significant negative effects for female incumbents must be eradicated too.
Until then, our Congressional elections cannot be considered truly fair.
Perhaps more troublesome for the political environment is the shockingly high
incumbency reelection rate of around 95%. Even in our small sample, only 20 of the 253
incumbents were not reelected. While it may be that the electorate is simply reelecting
the best candidate year after year, we believe it more likely that voters simply do not
investigate their other options and quickly reelect the name they recognize. Yet, there
may still be some hope to be found. Our results showed that during elections that
occurred closer to the aftermath of the Great Recession, economic indicators had a larger
and more statistically significant effect on election outcomes. Of the 20 incumbents in the
data set who were not reelected, 14 of them failed to be reelected in the 2008 and 2010
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elections. Beyond this data set, in the 2004 House election only seven incumbents lost
reelection while in 2010, fifty eight incumbents lost reelection. This could suggest that in
this time of economic turbulence and general dissatisfaction with our governing bodies,
the electorate used their voting power to express their distaste.
It is our hope that this study can be expanded upon in the future. We still have
very high hopes for where this research can go. We would like to see this data set
expanded to include all incumbent election races for every state going back decades. We
believe the way the electorate treats their incumbent holds a key for a great deal of
political analysis and understanding. We also believe that with the expansion of this data
set, some of the original economic variables could be reintegrated and used to boost the
explanatory power of these models. This research holds a great deal of potential for
incumbents, challengers, political strategists, reporters, analysts, and the general voting
electorate alike. We hope to see this research used to create further transparent analyses
and combat election inequalities.
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VIII. Appendix
TABLE 1

Variable Summary Statistics

Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

percent

63.81573

10.0206

33.08

97.89

year

2007.012

4.607174

2000

2014

incumdem

.4743083

.5003293

0

1

incumfemale

.1383399

.3459408

0

1

incumwhite

.9209486

.2703538

0

1

incumtenure

4.885375

4.020619

1

27

statemen

.4940711

.5009559

0

1

statewhite

.798419

.4019761

0

1

state65

.7193676

.4501988

0

1

stateunem

.0638051

.3145912

-.4028

1.1538

stategas

.2901329

.2239963

-.06992

.752311

usgdp

.0464379

.0169737

.0163058

.0664988

stategdp

.0485898

.0290803

-.0265138

.1403821

usrealgdp

.0230736

.0135334

-.0064534

.0393826

staterealgdp

.0255237

.0256168

-.0429289

.1033916

uspercapgdp

.0136943

.0131876

-.0157885

.027895

statepercapgdp

.0156673

.0242165

-.0546681

.0833291

stateperinc

.0451225

.0240762

-.004

.111

incumfemalestateunem

.005251

.0799069

-.25

.433
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TABLE 2

Variable Definitions

Variables

Definitions

percent

Percent of the general election vote received by the incumbent, measured from 0
to 100

year

Year the election took place

incumdem

A dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent was a Democrat

incumfemale

A dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent was female

incumwhite

A dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent was white

incumtenure

The number of terms previously served in Congress by the incumbent

statemen

A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state male population was equal or greater
than the national male population

statewhite

A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state white population was equal or greater
than the national white population

state65

A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state population over the age of 65 was equal
or greater than the national population over 65

stateunem

Percent change in state unemployment levels from previous January to October of
election year

stategas

Percent change in regional gas prices from previous January to October of
election year

usgdp

Percent change in national GDP from previous January to October of election
year

stategdp

Percent change in state GDP from previous January to October of election year

usrealgdp

Percent change in national real GDP from previous January to October of
election year

staterealgdp

Percent change in state real GDP from previous January to October of election
year

uspercapgdp

Percent change in national per capita GDP from previous January to October of
election year

statepercapgdp

Percent change in state per capita GDP from previous January to October of
election year

stateperinc

Percent change in personal income from previous January to October of election
year

incumfemalestateunem

Dummy interaction variable between incumfemale and stateunem
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40
-5.267443***
(1.999)
-

White Incumbent

Incumbent Tenure

State Unemployment

Female Interaction

0.0355

R2

0.0142

253

-2.275498
(2.825)

-

-3.409789*
(1.896)

-

-

-

-

64.69349***
(1.032)

2000-2014

0.1448

221

-5.663357
(3.451)

-

-5.383564***
(1.965)

.3543889**
(.1495)

-7.825535**
(3.173)

-4.630582***
(1.791)

2.897277**
(1.320)

71.20008***
(3.296)

2000-2012

0.1010

253

-1.668337
(2.740)

-

-3.341904*
(1.858)

.4780084***
(.1438)

-6.235671**
(3.113)

-3.44277**
(1.669)

1.279281
(1.255)

67.68998***
(3.276)

2000-2014

Equation 2

0.1476

221

-5.289879
(-1.53)

-11.984638**†

-4.909172**
(-2.41)

.344938**
(2.30)

-7.816859**
(-2.43)

-4.205731**
(-2.43)

3.013826**
(2.27)

71.01459***
(21.18)

2000-2012

0.1046

253

-1.257383
(2.745)

-10.919772†

-2.847015
(1.916)

.4654414***
(.1440)

-6.305147**
(3.150)

-3.3170229**
(1.586)

1.362936
(1.254)

67.72956***
(3.313)

2000-2014

Equation 3

*** Significant at 0.01; ** Significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.10.
† Level of significance determined through a test of joint significance between interaction term and unemployment variable.
Note: The dependent variable is the incumbent’s share of the two-party general election vote

221

N

-6.492668*
(3.522)

-

Female Incumbent

State Gas Price

-

66.72079***
(1.412)

Constant

Democratic Incumbent

2000-2012

Equation 1

Congressional Election Outcomes

Independent Variable

TABLE 3
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